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NICHOLASMAXWELL
UNDERSTANDING SENSATIONS
I
My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory,
or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory
put forward by Professor Smart.1 I shall argue that although the sensations
which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain
processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be
described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts
cannot be described by physics for the simple reason that physical
descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus
in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and
render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also
as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's
sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical pro-
cesses occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of
description that cannot be derived from any set of physical statements.
The kernel of the argument of this paper may be expressed as follows.
There are neurophysiological processes which can be understood as sen-
sations, as opposed to physical processes, only if sufficiently similar neuro-
physiological processes have occurred in one's own brain. More precisely,
there are facts about certain neurophysiological processes which are such
that there can be no description of these facts whose meaning one can
understand unless sufficiently similar neurophysiological processes have
occurred in one's own brain. But a person who has not had these neuro-
physiological processes occur in his brain is not thereby debarred from
completely understanding a complete physical description of such neuro-
physiological processes. It follows that a complete physical description of
these neurophysiological processes, supposing such a thing were possible,
would not be a complete description: it would not tell us all that there is
to know about the processes in question.
It might be thought that since the version of the identity thesis defended
here must imply that certain brain processes have mental features, in some
sense of 'mental', in addition to their ordinary physical features, this
1 See J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1963, Ch. 5.
version of the thesis must reintroduce just those conceptual difficulties
which Professor Smart's version avoids. I shall argue however that there
is nothing unintelligible or inexplicable about the mental feature of a brain
process, as construed here, and no conceptual problem as to how the
mental and physical features are inter-related. I hope to show that the
nature of sensations, or inner experiences, may seem unintelligible or in-
explicable precisely because the false assumption is made that if sensations
are to be understood at all then it must be possible to describe and
understand them in terms of some physical theory. Again, it may be
thought that there is .a conceptual problem about the relation between the
mind and the brain just because the above dualism of description (physical
and non-physical) is neglected. The genuine, but unacknowledged, dual-
ism of description may delude us into believing in a dualism of substance,
mind and brain.
II
The brain process theory, or identity thesis, as formulated by U. T.
Place,2 Professor Smart and others, states that all sensations or inner
experiences are brain processes. The theory implies not that the two
phrases 'such and such inner experience' and 'such and such brain process'
ever have the same meaning, but only that the first phrase, as a matter of
contingent fact, refers always to some brain process. Thus the theory is
put forward as an extremely plausible empirical hypothesis; it is not
intended to provide an analysis of 'sensation' or 'inner experience'.
The theory presupposes that:
(1) In experiencing a sensation a person is presented with evidence for
the existence of some entity or process, and is not merely disposed
to behave in a certain way.
(2) A person who experiences sensations on two distinct occasions is,
in general, in a position to judge whether or not the entities or pro-
cesses, for whose existence he has evidence, are similar or dissimilar
with respect to some feature or other. (This leaves open the ques-
tion as to whether or not the person is in a position to know in what
respect the two entities or processes are similar or dissimilar.)
In what follows I shall use the word 'sensation' to refer to that entity or
process, whatever it may be, for whose existence one has evidence in
`experiencing a sensation' or 'having an inner experience', and I shall say
two sensations are similar if the person who is presented with evidence
for the existence of the sensations, judges them to be similar. The two
phrases 'experience a sensation' and 'have an inner experience', I shall use
interchangeably, with no technical meaning assigned to them. The brain
process theory may now be stated as follows:
2U. T. Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process', British Journal of
Psychology, 1956, 47, pp. 44-50.
(3) Sensations are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes This
means at least (a) the distinctive features of sensations and brain
processes may, without conceptual difficulties, be ascribed to one and
the same thing; (b) two sensations are similar if and only if similar
physical processes occur in the brain of the person in question.
In addition to (3) it may be held that:
(4) All features or characteristics of sensations can in principle be
described, explained, understood physically.
I wish to argue that (3) is a plausible empirical hypothesis, fully in
accordance with ordinary experience and present day knowledge, but that
if (3) is accepted, (4) must be rejected. I shall give only an outline of
the first part of this argument, since here I am in essentials in agreement
with Professor Smart.
In what follows I shall consider only visual sensations, but similar
remarks will apply to the other kinds of sensations.
I assume here without discussion the truth of (1), (2) and (3b).
Granted this, it will I think be conceded that in order to establish that (3)
is a plausible empirical hypothesis it is necessary and sufficient for me to
establish that:
(5) All that a person knows about that entity or process, for whose
existence he has evidence in having an inner experience, is com-
patible with the hypothesis that the entity is a brain process.
Clearly the crucial point to be considered here is this: what precisely
does a person know in experiencing a certain visual sensation? Professor
Smart considers the case of a person who experiences a yellowish-orange
after-image, and asserts, in effect, that such a person knows only 'What is
going on in me is like what is going on in me when my eyes are open,
the lighting is normal, etc., etc., and there really is a yellowish-orange
patch on the wall'.3 Professor Smart seems to take this to imply that the
person knows only that some process is occurring which is similar, in some
wholly unknown respect, to some other process.4 This conclusion I wish
to contest. I maintain that a person who experiences the above after-image
knows not merely 'A process is occurring which is similar, in some wholly
unknown respect, to some other process', but also 'Whatever it is that is
going on in me, it is such that if certain other conditions—necessary but
not sufficient conditions for perception—had been fulfilled (e.g. if there
really had been a yellowish-orange patch on the wall, my eyes had been
open, etc., etc.), then I would have been perceiving a yellowish-orange
patch'. We might say, condensing all this, that a person who experiences
a yellowish-orange after-image knows 'It is, for me, at this moment, just as
if I am perceiving a yellowish-orange patch', or 'My state is such that it
3 J. J. C. Smart, op. cit., p. 94.
4 See ibid., p. 95.
is just as if I am perceiving a yellowish-orange patch'. As long as 'This
patch is yellowish-orange' can constitute a true description of an actual
patch, 'My state is such that it is just as if I am perceiving a yellowish-
orange patch' can be interpreted as constituting a genuinely informative
description of the state in question. It is because the person possesses this
slender additional item of knowledge about what is going on in him that he
is able to classify or describe what is going on in him as a visual sensation
of a yellowish-orange patch.
It is important to note however that this additional knowledge about
what is going on in him does not conflict with the hypothesis that what is
going on is some brain process. It is, in Professor Smart's terminology,
`topic-neutral'. Since a person who experiences a visual sensation knows
this much and no more about what is going on in him, this establishes (5),
and hence the plausibility of (3).
I might add that my position here does not I think differ substantially
from Professor Smart's. It is only when the question arises 'What meaning
can be assigned to 'yellowish-orange' such that the proposition Tor some
x, x is yellowish-orange' is true?' that our respective views really diverge.
A consequence of the above argument, vital for the argument of section
IV below, is that a second person can understand that which the first
person knows and understands in experiencing the yellowish-orange after-
image only if he can understand the meaning of the term 'yellowish-orange'.
`It is for me just as if I am perceiving a yellowish-orange patch' can only
be understood if 'yellowish-orange' is understood.
It should perhaps be pointed out that a person may experience a visual
sensation and not be in a position to know even this much about what is
going on in him A person who has just been cured of congenital blindness
and who experiences a visual sensation that he would later describe as the
visual sensation of a yellowish-orange patch, probably cannot be said to
know at the time that this is what he is experiencing, in that he does not
yet fully possess the concept, fully understand the meaning of, `yellowish-
orange'. In order fully to understand the meaning of colour words it is
perhaps necessary to be able to perceive coloured objects, or discriminate
between objects with respect to their colour, and this the above person may not
initially be able to do (although presumably such a person would be able to
discriminate between having a red light, say, and a blue light shone into
his eyes). I shall discuss later (see section V) the question: Does
'yellowish-orange' have some kind of minimal meaning which could be
understood by the person who has just been cured of congenital blindness?
Here, I assume (in accordance with (1) above) that a person can judge
whether or not two successive visual sensations he experiences are
similar, even if he does not fully possess the relevant perceptual
concepts.
It may be objected that there is something very puzzling about this
assumption, in that, in view of the discussion above, it appears to imply
that a person can judge whether or not two processes are similar even if
he knows nothing about any respect in which the two processes are similar.
It should be noted that Professor Smart accepts this implication.' The
argument of this paper, however, does not presuppose this Smartian thesis.
In section V, I shall argue that a legitimate meaning can be assigned to
`yellowish-orange' which could be understood by the person who has just
been cured of congenital blindness, and hence that such a person is in a
position to know something about the sensations he experiences (e.g. 'I am
experiencing yellowish-orange' in the above sense of `yellowish-orange'),
even though he does not fully possess the perceptual concept 'yellowish-
orange'.
III
Before giving my reasons for maintaining that in experiencing a sensa-
tion a person is in a position to know something about that which is
happening which cannot be described or understood in terms of any
physical theory, it will be convenient to consider first the following
problem: what interpretation can one reasonably give to the statement
`Two persons are experiencing similar sensations', granted the truth of the
above brain process theory?
Three points should be noted.
(a) The problem of giving an interpretation to 'Two persons are
experiencing similar sensations' is not peculiar to the above brain
process theory, since it is not clear what we should ordinarily want
to mean by this statement, irrespective of whether or not we have
accepted the above theory.
(b) The meaning of 'Two persons are experiencing similar sensations'
is problematic because it is not clear how even in principle the sen-
sation of one person could be compared with the sensation of another.
In order to give an unproblematic interpretation to the above sentence it
will suffice to specify how in principle a sensation experienced by
one person can be compared with a sensation experienced by another.
(c) Our ordinary thoughts and talk about sensations tend to be infected
with Cartesian dualism, with the view that sensations are peculiarly
`mental' entities, wholly distinct from brain processes. Hence we
must not be surprised if an unproblematic interpretation of 'Two
people experience similar sensations', which is compatible with the
above brain process theory, fails to capture all that we might hope to
mean by this sentence. A shift in ordinary meaning is bound to
occur when a theory, whose truth is presupposed implicitly in the
meaning of certain words, turns out to be false.
5 See ibid., p. 95-6.
The problem, then, is to determine how one person, X, could in prin-
ciple discover what some other person, Y, is experiencing, so that he can
compare Y's sensation with his own. But, one wants to say, Y's sensa-
tions or inner experiences are essentially private; only if X could achieve
the impossible and actually become Y, could X discover what Y is ex-
periencing.
X cannot actually become Y, but X can, in principle, (we may assume)
become something which is in all relevant physical respects, very similar
to Y; and this we may regard as being sufficient for X to discover what Y
is experiencing. I suggest, in other words, that the meaning of 'X and Y
are experiencing similar sensations' is to be interpreted in such a way
that, given that:
(a) a brain process A is occurring in X's brain, a brain process B in Y's;
(b) X experiences sensations similar to the above if and only if A occurs
in his brain (and similarly for Y visa vis B);
(c) A and B occur successively in the brain of any one person, Z;
then Z's comparison of the sensations he experiences constitutes a com-
parison of the sensations experienced by X and Y.
Given this 'brain process' interpretation, the meaning of 'X and Y are
experiencing similar sensations' is unproblematic, in that it is in principle
possible for anyone to compare X's and Y's sensations.
This interpretation of the above sentence seems to me to be reasonably
close to what one would ordinarily want this sentence to mean. If Z is to
discover what X is experiencing then surely, on any view, Z must discover
what it would be like to have happen to himself that which is happening
to X—which, granted the above brain process theory, is reasonably inter-
preted as: If Z is to discover what X is experiencing then Z must reproduce
in his own brain relevant physical processes occurring in X's brain. Only if
sensations are thought of as entities or processes entirely distinct from
anything going on in the brain will the above interpretation of 'X and Y
are experiencing similar sensations' seem far removed from anything that
we should ordinarily want to mean by this sentence. But there is, it seems,
no evidence whatsoever for the existence of such entities or processes. And
in any case, once one conceives of sensations as peculiarly mental entities,
entirely distinct from brain processes, it becomes wholly obscure what could
possibly be meant by 'Two persons are experiencing similar sensations',
since there is no conceivable way in which such mental entities existing in
different minds could be compared.
As far as I can see, the only coherent alternative to the above brain
process interpretation, is an interpretation which presupposes that two
people who can make the same discriminations with respect to some kind
of physical stimulus, experience similar sensations when exposed to the
same stimulus. But the above brain process interpretation has one
immense advantage over this 'behavioural, discriminatory-response' inter-
pretation. We should ordinarily want to say that it is possible for two
persons to make identical discriminations with respect to some particular
kind of stimulus (e.g. visible light of various wavelengths), and yet to have
quite different sensations when exposed to precisely the same stimulus
(e.g. light of a particular wavelength). If we adopt the behavioural inter-
pretation, this is not a conceptual possibility. But if we adopt the brain
process interpretation, this is quite straightforwardly possible, since the
two persons may make identical discriminations, and yet sufficiently dis-
similar physical processes may occur in their respective brains when they
are exposed to precisely the same stimulus. Thus not only is the brain
process interpretation of the sentence 'Two persons are experiencing
similar sensations' reasonably close to what one would ordinarily want to
mean by this sentence (which is all that was required), but further this
interpretation is closer to the ordinary meaning than the only apparent
alternative, the behavioural interpretation.
One or two detailed points need to be made about the above brain
process interpretation. In the first place the interpretation is clearly only
possible if any two persons who undertake to compare the sensations of
X and Y in the above manner, obtain the same result. Thus the inter-
pretation presupposes that if one person, X, has two different processes
A and B occur successively in his brain and experiences similar sensations,
then if any other person, Y, has A and B occur successively in his brain,
Y also will experience similar sensations. This may quite reasonably be
regarded as a (potentially) falsifiable, and therefore empirical hypothesis,
a crucial point being that X (or anyone else) can test whether Y has, on
the two occasions, similar sensations, in that he can test whether Y can
differentiate between A and B occurring in his (i.e., Y's) brain.
The interpretation does not imply that if Z is to compare the sensations of
X and Y he must duplicate precisely the brain states of X and Y in his own
brain. Instead Z can determine- to what extent the brain states of X and
Y can be varied without X and Y being able to make any corresponding
discriminations. In this way it will be possible for Z to determine a
particular type of brain process that corresponds for X, or for Y, to a
particular type of sensation.
One questionable assumption has been made above, namely that any
type of brain process that occurs in the brain of one person can be repro-
duced in the brain of any other person. But this in general may not be
possible: the structure or material of the brain of one person, X, may differ
from that of the brain of another person, Y, to such an extent that many
physical processes that occur in X's brain cannot occur in Y's, and vice
versa. One might attempt to overcome this difficulty by prescribing for X,
say, brain surgery sufficiently drastic to permit the occurrence in his brain
of all processes that occur in Y's brain. But at the most this would
ensure only that some person could compare X's and Y's sensations, not
that X could do this, since we might not want to say that X, as an
individual, would survive the operation. On the other hand perhaps this
is sufficient for our purposes. Thus we may stipulate that it is meaningful
to assert that X and Y are experiencing similar, or dissimilar, sensations,
as long as it is possible for there to be some person, Z, whose brain is
such that the physical processes occurring in X's brain and in Y's, can
occur in it without bringing about the destruction of Z. However in
what follows I shall make the empirical assumption that such problems
would arise only if human beings were to try to ascertain whether or not
such things as Robots and Martians experience sensations similar to those
experienced by human beings (the Robots and Martians in question
behaving just as if they were human beings). I assume, in other words,
that the structure and material of any two human brains are sufficiently
similar to permit relevant processes that occur in one brain, to occur in the
other brain.
IV
I come now to the main part of my argument, my defence of the thesis
that it is impossible to describe or understand physically all that a person
can know in experiencing a sensation.
Consider any particular property or quality Q which does actually exist
in the world, i.e., which can be truly ascribed to some objects. In order to
become aware of the nature of Q, i.e., in order to understand the
meaning of the term 'Q', it will be necessary to have some experiences,
and therefore, according to (3), necessary to have some brain processes
occur in one's own brain. Now there are two possibilities. On the one
hand it may not be necessary to experience any particular kind of sensa-
tion. (Two sensations are of the same kind if, roughly, they are suffi-
ciently similar, where similarity of sensations is interpreted as above.)
But on the other hand it may be that the meaning of '0' can only be
understood if one has experienced a particular kind of sensation, and
hence, according to (3), if one has had a particular kind of brain process
occur in one's own brain. This possibility cannot be excluded on a
priori grounds. Obvious candidates for such properties are colours,
sounds, smells and tastes as ordinarily conceived. For example, redness
is such a property if (a) there are some red objects, (b) a person who
has not experienced the visual sensation of redness, e.g., someone who is
congenitally blind, cannot fully understand the meaning of the word 'red'.
Assuming for the moment that a visual property P of this latter kind
does exist, suppose one person, X, is experiencing the visual sensation of
P, i.e. a certain kind of brain process, A say, is occurring in his brain.
Suppose further that X frequently perceives objects with the property P,
and understands the meaning of 'P'. Now assume that there is a second
person, Y, who has never had A occur in his brain, who cannot, therefore,
understand the meaning of 'P', and who, further, cannot perceive that
objects have the property P, i.e., whenever he looks at an object that does
have P, A does occur in his brain. (If `P' is 'redness' then Y might be
congenitally blind.) My argument is that Y is not thereby prevented from
giving a complete physical description and explanation of all that happens to
X and all that X does; he may for example be able to predict and explain the
occurrences of A in X's brain, and the perceptual discriminations with
respect to P that X is able to make. Nonetheless there is one fact about
what is happening to X, which X knows and understands, but which
must remain completely unintelligible to Y, namely that X is experiencing
the visual sensation of P, i.e. that it is for X just as if he is perceiving an
object with the property P. Y cannot understand this because he cannot
understand the meaning of the term 'P'. By hypothesis, this fact becomes
intelligible to Y only if A occurs in his brain. Hence, 'X is experiencing
the visual sensation of P' is a fact about what is happening to X which
cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory.
During the course of this argument I have assumed that:
(6) There are what may be called P-properties, that is, properties of
the above type, which (a) are perceived by human beings, (b) are
not physical properties, i.e. cannot be referred to by any purely
physical term or statement.
I shall now attempt to justify this assumption.
As far as I am concerned, (6a) scarcely seems to be an assumption that
requires any extended philosophical argument for its justification: my
most casual observation appears to verify conclusively that properties
such as colours, sounds, smells, tastes exist which I could have had no
conception of if I had not myself experienced the appropriate kinds of
sensations. In order to understand all that I would wish to mean by the
word 'red', for example, it is not sufficient to be able to discriminate between
objects that I perceive to be red, and objects that I perceive to have some
other colour: a congenitally blind person might possess a piece of
apparatus which enabled him to do this, and yet it seems clear that such
a person could not fully understand what I mean when I assert of an object
that it is red. In order to be able to understand this it is necessary to have
experienced a sensation sufficiently similar to a sensation that I would
describe as the visual sensation of a red patch.
The word 'red' can of course be assigned a meaning, a 'behavioural' or
`discriminatory-response' or 'physicalistic' meaning (`reds' say), such that
the above congenitally blind person would be able to understand 'This is
reds'. Further, since it is possible that two persons, X and Y, who make
precisely the same colour discriminations, may nonetheless experience dis-
similar sensations when looking at some object they both describe as 'red'
(where 'dissimilar sensations' is interpreted as above), it is possible that
the 'public' meaning of 'red' is equivalent merely to the meaning of 'red,',
i.e. that which the above congenitally blind person can understand. It is
possible, in other words, that in asserting of some object that it is red we
manage to communicate to some non-colour-blind person no more than
that which the above congenitally blind person can understand. Never-
theless the word 'red' can legitimately be assigned a meaning (`red2' say),
by me, for example, such that 'red,' can be understood only if one has
experienced a certain kind of visual sensation. There is nothing in prin-
ciple 'private' about the meaning of 'red2', since, as I have argued above, it
can in principle be determined whether or not two persons experience
similar or dissimilar sensations. If my ordinary experience does not con-
firm the truth of 'For some x, x is red2', then I find it difficult to see how any
statement whatsoever can be said to be confirmed by means of experience.
I assume the reader is presented with similar convincing perceptual
evidence for the existence of P-properties. Clearly, as long as `P-proper-
ties exist' does not conflict with any empirical statement that we are in-
clined, for one reason or another, to believe to be true, we have every
reason to believe, and no reason to disbelieve, that P-properties such as
colours, sounds, smells and tastes do exist.
Assuming, for the moment, that there is no such empirical statement
which conflicts with the thesis P-properties exist', I turn now to my
defence of (6b).
One might attempt to justify (6b) as follows. A physical statement
(description, explanation or theory) is by definition an objective statement.
But 'objective statement' means just 'statement that is in principle intelli-
gible, meaningful, to any rational being'.6 Now suppose there is a property
which is such that the meaning of any term, `P' say, which refers to the
property, can be understood only if the brain process A has occurred in
one's own brain. Presumably it is in principle possible for a being to be
rational even though the structure or material of the being's brain is such
that the physical process A cannot occur in it. It follows that any state-
ment which ascribes P to some object cannot be objective, in the above
sense, and hence cannot be a physical statement.
This argument breaks down however if the assumption that physics is,
by definition, objective in the above sense, is rejected. I give below
therefore an alternative defence of (6b), which does not depend on the
assumption that any physical theory or explanation is, by definition,
objective in the above sense. I begin by defending the thesis that at least
`red2' (interpreted as above) cannot be a physical term. I have condensed
6 For such an explication of 'objective' see my paper 'Physics and
Common Sense', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol.
XVI, No. 64, 1966, pp. 310-1.
my defence of this thesis into the following four remarks (bolstered up by
arguments where necessary).
1. The task of physics is to predict and explain natural phenomena, that
is, to predict and explain the outcome or result of any possible physical
experiment. Any term whose meaning is such that it cannot be required
for the physical prediction or explanation of some possible physical
experiment is not a physical term.
2. There is no term, statement, theory of contemporary physics that refers
to the property red2.
The terms of physics have an agreed, 'public' meaning; but since at the
moment it is not possible to compare the sensations experienced by different
people when they look at objects, or rays of light, that they classify as 'red',
we have no reason to suppose that the agreed, 'public' meaning of 'red' is
`red,'. If 'red' qualifies as an observational term of physics (and this may well
be denied), then 'red' must be interpreted as `reds' and not `red,'. In other
words in order to understanding the meaning of 'red', construed as a physical
term, it is, conceivably, necessary to be able to discriminate between those
objects ordinarily classified as 'red', and those objects ordinarily classified as
`non-red'; but it is not necessary in addition to experience a certain kind of
sensation when looking at an object generally classified as 'red'. Hence 'red',
construed as a physical term, cannot be interpreted as `red,', as referring to
the P-property red2.
It should be noted that, since physics cannot, at least at the present time,
be required to predict the existence of red2, the fact that no current physical
theory refers to, or predicts the existence of red2, constitutes no evidence
whatsoever for the thesis that red2 does not exist. The fact that physics today
makes no mention of red2 is evidence only for the thesis that the physicist
does not need to refer to red2 in order to predict and explain the kind of
experimental results at present under review.
3. As long as physics is not required to predict the existence of the
property red,, that is, as long as a statement of the form 'x is red2' or
'X is experiencing the visual sensation of red2' cannot qualify as a
statement of the result of a physical experiment, no term that refers to
the property red2 can be required for the physical prediction or
explanation of the result of any physical experiment.
If current physical theories are taken into account, it is almost impossible
to conceive how the above thesis could be false. Certainly there is no
known physical experiment, granted the above restriction, which is such that it is
possible to conceive how the physical explanation of the result of the
experiment could require the inclusion of a term that referred to red2. It
seems very improbable indeed that such an experiment could ever crop up.
If such an experiment is possible, then our present physical theories must be
very seriously astray indeed. Of course all present day
theories may turn out to be false; but not, one is inclined to say, that
false.
It might be asked: But suppose one wants to give a physical explanation
of either (a) a person's ability to discriminate between objects ordinarily
classified as 'red' and objects ordinarily classified as `non-red'; or (b) the
processes that occur in a person's brain when he looks at objects ordinarily
classified as 'red'. Can one be certain that an explanation that incor-
porated the term 'red,', let us say, could not qualify as a physical explana-
tion?
It must be admitted that it is not at present possible to give a com-
pletely satisfactory physical explanation of (a), let alone (b). But this is
due to the great complexity of the eye and the brain. We have no reason
to believe that current physical theories are, in themselves, inadequate for
the solution of this problem; rather it is our ability to apply these theories
to this particular problem that is inadequate. But in any case it is clear
that a satisfactory solution to the above problem,, far from incorporating
the term 'red,', would not even incorporate the term 'red,' (but instead
terms such as 'light of such and such wavelength', that is, terms
whose meaning can be understood even though the meaning of 'red,' or
'red,' is not understood). Any explanation that incorporated 'red,' or `red,'
in an essential way would be completely unsatisfactory as a physical
explanation because it would be wholly ad hoc: the explanation would
incorporate a theory which could be applied only to the highly specific
phenomenon (a) or (b). For example, one might attempt to give a physical
explanation of (b) in terms of some such theory as: 'If an object 0 is
red, and if a physical system, S, of such and such a type, is related to 0
in such and such a way, then the process A occurs in the 'brain' of S'.
(Here, S is such that the body of the person in question is an S-type
system.) But such an 'explanation' would be completely ad hoc: it could
not possibly qualify as a physical explanation of the occurrence of A at all.
For the above 'theory' could be applied only in the extremely complex,
arbitrarily restricted circumstances that the 'theory' specifies; the 'theory'
could not possibly be derived from some more comprehensive physical
theory that applied to a wide range of phenomena, because no set of
physical statements (which do not incorporate the term 'red,') could
entail a 'theory' of the above type that does incorporate the term 'red,'.
4. Physics is not required to predict the existence of red,, that is, no
statement of the form `x is red,' or 'X is experiencing the visual
sensation of red,' can qualify as a statement of the outcome or
result of a physical experiment.
Any physical experiment can I think be stipulated to be such that the
outcome or result of the experiment can in principle be recorded in an
objective, 'public' manner: clearly if 'objective' is interpreted as above,
no statement of the result of a physical experiment can refer to a P-
property. More specifically, any physical experiment can be stipulated to be
such that the outcome or result of the experiment can in principle be recorded
instrumentally, as a configuration of objects or marks, e.g., as the position
of a pointer on a dial, or as lines, dots or areas of exposure on a photographic
plate. There would be something very odd indeed about a physical experiment
which was such that its result could not in principle be recorded in this kind
of way. In other words, without loss of generality, it can be stipulated that a
necessary condition for an experiment to be a physical experiment is that the
statement of the outcome or result of the experiment is such that in order to
understand the meaning of this statement, it is not necessary to have
experienced a particular kind of sensation. This is not to deny of course that if a
person is going to verify such a statement of the outcome of an experiment, that
person must of necessity experience sensations of some kind or other, e.g.
visual or tactile. My point is only that if an experiment is to qualify as a
physical experiment then the statement of the outcome of the experiment
(whose verification involves experiencing such and such visual sensations say
for one person, such and such tactile sensations for another person) must be
such that in order to understand the meaning of this statement, it is not
necessary to have experienced a particular kind of sensation.
In adopting the above necessary condition for an experiment to be a physical
experiment one is in effect imposing a restriction on what one chooses to
mean by the term 'physical'. It must be admitted that, in a sense, one is at
liberty to assign whatever meaning one pleases to any term; in particular
one might assign a meaning to 'physical' which is such that any singular
existential statement qualifies as a possible statement of the result of a
physical experiment, in which case, of course, it would be a contradiction
in terms to assert that non-physical P-properties exist. Here I wish to say
only that the above restriction that I have imposed on the meaning of 'physical'
is non-arbitrary, and is in accordance with what seems to be ordinarily meant
by 'physical'. (It might be noted however that even if this restriction is
rejected, one would still not be able to give a satisfactory physical
explanation of the existence of a P-property such as red,, for the 'explanation'
would involve ad hoc theories somewhat similar to the ad hoc theory
discussed under remark 3 above.)
One might argue, in a somewhat Smartian frame of mind, that the
ultimate aim of physics is to discover, or formulate, a comprehensive
physical theory, which, ideally, would postulate and describe just a few
different kinds of 'fundamental physical entities'. Granted that there are no
valid general or philosophical objections to interpreting physical theories
realistically, the above kind of theory could be interpreted as asserting that
the world is, in a sense, made up entirely of the fundamental physical entities in
question. How can this be reconciled with the thesis that
physical theories are not required to predict the existence of P-properties,
granted that such properties exist?
The answer to this is simply that the meaning of `comprehensive' in
this context is such that a comprehensive physical theory suffices in prin-
ciple to predict and explain the result of any possible physical experiment.
In asserting that the world is made up entirely of fundamental physical
entities, one is asserting that, given any possible physical experiment, the
so-called initial conditions and the outcome of the experiment can in
principle be specified or described in terms of the fundamental physical
theory, and hence that this theory is comprehensive, in the above sense.
As long as necessary and sufficient physical conditions can in principle
be specified for the existence of a P-property such as red2, the physicist is
entitled to claim that his neglect of this feature of things does not mean
that there are entities to which physical theories do not apply.
I conclude from the above discussion that `red2' cannot qualify as a
physical term, and, in general, that such P-properties as colours, sounds,
smells and tastes cannot be referred to by any physical term or statement.
So far I have assumed without discussion that there are no objections to
the thesis that P-properties exist. Professor Smart has however put
forward certain arguments which purport to establish the extreme im-
plausibility of the thesis that P-properties exist.? But these arguments
hinge on the contention that the thesis that P-properties exist (or, in Pro-
fessor 'Smart's own terminology, the thesis that objective, unanalysable,
intrinsic quale exist) is incompatible with the main body of scientific
knowledge. And this contention is, I have argued, mistaken. The fact
that physical theories do not refer to or predict the existence of P-properties
constitutes no evidence whatsoever for the thesis that such properties do
not exist.8
Thus we have every reason to believe, and no reason to disbelieve, that
such non-physical P-properties as colours, sounds, smells and tastes do
exist.
One might say, speaking rather loosely, that a physicist who could
treat all human beings merely as complicated pieces of physical apparatus,
distinct from himself, would have no reason to suspect the existence of
P-properties. He would not require the hypothesis that such properties
exist in order to predict and explain the workings and behaviour of his
pieces of apparatus. But the human physicist cannot treat all human
beings in this way, for he is himself such a piece of apparatus; conse-
quently he cannot help but perceive colours, sounds, smells, etc. In so far
as one is a physicist one assumes that one learns only by observing and
theorizing about the behaviour of pieces of apparatus; one neglects
J. J. C. Smart, op. cit., pp. 66-75.
6 For a more detailed criticism of Professor Smart on this point, see my paper
`Physics and Common Sense', op. cit., pp. 295-311.
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that one is oneself a piece of apparatus of a certain kind, and that there
are, as a result, things which one has discovered which could have been
discovered in no other way.
V
This in a sense concludes my defence of the thesis that although
sensations are brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations
which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory.
There is however one question that I have deliberately, for expositional
reasons, left unanswered. Suppose one person, X, experiences a sensation
similar, let us say, to that which some other person, Y, would describe
as the visual sensation of a red patch. Suppose further that X does not
fully understand the meaning which Y gives to 'red', perhaps because X
has only just been cured of congenital blindness, and hence is not in a
position to know 'It is for me just as if I am perceiving a red patch'. The
question is: Does X know anything about that entity, for whose existence
he has evidence in experiencing the above sensation? This question
can be reformulated as follows: Can a sort of minimal sensory meaning
be given to 'red' (`red3' say) such that 'I am experiencing red.,' can be
true and meaningful to X?
It would I think be possible to defend a version of the above brain
process theory, T, say, which gives a negative answer to this question.
But to my mind a version, T2 say, which gives an affirmative answer to
this question is much more plausible. For surely a person who experiences
sensations that we would judge to be visual sensations of red, green and
blue patches, does know something about what is going on in him, even if
he does not fully possess the perceptual concepts 'red', 'green', 'blue'.
Suppose a certain kind of brain process, A, can be induced artificially
in the brain of a person, X, who is congenitally blind. Suppose a second
person, Y, frequently perceives red objects (i.e., understands `red,'),
knows that A occurs in his brain when and only when he experiences
sensations of redness, and knows further when A occurs in X's brain.
Now surely Y can teach X to use the word `red,', so that X can later
convey information to Y (or indeed to a second congenitally blind person,
X', who has also been taught by Y to use `red,') by asserting 'I am
experiencing red3'. Note that (a) X may not be able to understand fully the
meaning of 'red,' or `red2', (b) a fourth person, Z, who can understand a
complete physical description of A, but who has not had A occur in his
own brain, cannot understand what X, X', and Y understand by `I am
experiencing red3'.
That which X and Y understand and Z does not understand, one might
describe (but not analyse) as 'What it is to have A occur in one's own
brain'. This tells Z (a) why he does not understand that which X and Y
understand, even though he can give a complete physical description of A,
(b) what he must do in order to be able to understand that which X and Y
understand.
I conclude that T2 is to be accepted and T1 rejected.
At first sight it might seem that T2 reintroduces just those conceptual
difficulties concerning the relation between 'mental' and physical features
that T1 successfully avoids. Certainly there is a sense in which T2 permits
one to know a little more about one's sensations than that which Ti
permits. But the important point to note is that this little additional
knowledge does not constitute additional knowledge about the physical or
perceptual properties that the sensation either does or does not possess.
Hence if T1 successfully avoids the above kind of conceptual difficulties,
so does T2.
It should be noted however that as far as the main argument of this
paper is concerned (i.e. the argument of section IV), it is quite irrelevant
whether one decides to accept T2 or T1.
VI
Both T2 and T1 can be interpreted as attributing 'mental' features to the
events that occur within our heads, in addition to the ordinary physical
features of such events. Here, 'mental' feature of brain process A may be
defined as that which (a) one can discern, become aware of, only if A
occurs in one's own brain (b) one can understand only if a brain process
sufficiently similar to A has occurred in one's own brain. There is, I have
argued, nothing conceptually puzzling about the nature of such a mental
feature, and no conceptual problem as to how mental and physical
features are inter-related. However, the feeling may persist that such
problems must confront a brain process theory such as T2 or Ti. I want
now to suggest two main kinds of reasons why there may appear to be
such conceptual problems even though in fact there are none.
In the first place, the assumption may be made that whenever a person
experiences a sensation there is some entity which that person perceives.
Thus it may be assumed that a person who is blindfolded and who ex-
periences the visual sensation of a red square perceives some kind of red
square. But (a) the person cannot consistently place or locate this red
square among other perceived objects, (b) no one else is able to perceive
the red square. Hence it seems that the red square is some kind of
private, ghostly object, quite distinct from anything going on in the brain.
It becomes wholly obscure how anything going on in the brain could
possibly be related to this mysterious entity.
But of course a person who is blindfolded and who experiences the
visual sensation of a red patch perceives nothing at all. Thus he has no
evidence whatsoever for the existence of some entity with the perceptual
properties of being red and square. It is true that he does have evidence
for the existence of something, and is, furthermore, in a position to know
something about this 'thing': in view of the analogy with perception, we
may, if we wish, talk here of a kind of observation, to be distinguished from
perception, which might be called 'apperception'. We can say that a person
X who experiences the visual sensation of a red square apperceives
something with the apperceptual properties of being 'redA' and square say.
But 'What is happening to me is redA' means roughly `What is happening
to me is such that it is for me just as if I am perceiving a red object', where
'red' will be understood correctly by some other person Y only if whenever
X and Y look at objects that X perceives to be red, sufficiently similar
relevant brain processes occur in both brains. Hence there is no conceptual
problem involved in ascribing such apperceptual properties to some kind of
brain process. Further, it should be noted that in experiencing a visual
sensation a person has evidence, not for the existence of some entity which
can have no spatial location, but rather for the existence of some entity whose
spatial location is left undetermined.
It is true that the mental feature of a particular brain process, A, can be
detected, or discerned, only by that person in whose brain A occurs. But this
fact only implies that there is something mysterious or inexplicable about the
mental feature of A if one assumes in addition that the mental feature is some
kind of perceptual or physical feature, which thus should be detectable or
discernable by other people as well, by examining A under a microscope
perhaps, or taking extremely delicate electroencephalograph recordings. But
of course the mental feature of A is not any kind of perceptual or physical
feature of A. A description of the mental feature of A tells one no more than
what it is to have a physical process sufficiently similar to A occur in one's
own brain: it tells one nothing about the perceptual or physical features of
A.
The fact that apperception has a kind of certainty not possessed by perception
may suggest that there is something conceptually puzzling about construing
apperception as a kind of observation. Thus the possibility of verifying
propositions apperceptually with certainty seems to contradict Einstein's
eminently sensible dictum: In so far as a proposition refers to reality, it is not
certain; in so far as it is certain, it does not refer to reality9. But if
'proposition' is construed as 'statement with a publicly agreed meaning' then
no such contradiction arises. For even if there is one person who cannot be
mistaken about the truth of, let us say, `I am experiencing the visual
sensation of a red patch', there is no other person who can be certain as to
what precisely this statement means, since in order to check on the meaning
of 'red', elaborate comparisons of brain processes will have to be undertaken.
I conclude that there is nothing
Einstein's remark referred specifically to mathematical propositions. See
A. Einstein, Geometrie and Erfahrung, Springier, Berlin, 1921, pp. 3-4.
conceptually puzzling about construing apperception as a kind of observa-
tion.
In the second place, it may be thought that there must be something
conceptually very puzzling about the mental feature of a brain process if
that feature cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical
theory. Here is a property, so it seems, which must mysteriously evade
the physicist's grasp, however strenuously he attempts to describe and
understand it.
But of course the mental feature of a brain process evades being
described by physics for the straightforward reason that it is just the kind
of property that a physical description is specifically designed to avoid
mentioning. Only if it is presupposed that a complete physical description
must be a complete description will the fact that physics does not describe
sensations as sensations seem conceptually disquieting.
Again, it is true in a sense that there are facts about brain processes
which cannot be understood in terms of any physical theory. But this
does not mean that these facts present the physicist with an insurmount-
able problem. It means rather that even if the physicist has solved all
his problems, there might still be facts that he would not understand for
the simple reason that he could not understand the meaning of any
description of these facts.
According to both versions of the brain process theory developed here, T2
and Ti, there is of course the genuine empirical (but non-physical) problem
of correlating particular kinds of sensations with particular kinds of
physical processes occurring in the brain. There is however no further
conceptual problem concerning this correlation. Such a conceptual prob-
lem may appear to arise because it is assumed that if the correlation
between a particular kind of brain process and sensation is to be under-
stood it must be possible to give a physical explanation of this correlation.
But such an explanation is impossible, not because this is a problem
insoluble to physics, but because this is not a physical problem at all. In
so far as it is a problem, it is the above empirical, non-physical problem; in
so far as it is a physical problem, it does not exist. Hence once the above
empirical problem has been solved, all that there is to understand about
the corrrelation has been understood.
It is of course conceivable that knowledge of the physical structure of
the brain alone should enable one to predict whether or not a person will
be able to discriminate between the occurrence of two distinct kinds of
physical processes, A and B, in his brain. This we may interpret as
giving a physical explanation of why similar, or dissimilar, sensations
correspond to A and to B. Such an explanation must however fail to render
intelligible on what basis the person discriminates between the occurrence
of A and B (if this is what he does do) : it must fail to make clear what
sensations
the person experiences when A and B occur in his brain. (This can of
course only be discovered if A and B occur in one's own brain.)
Finally, there may appear to be a conceptual problem concerning the
relation between sensations and brain processes because on the one hand it
seems clear that sensations are causally connected with certain physical
processes (for example with physical processes occurring in the optic
nerve), and yet it seems to be impossible in principle to give a physical
specification of the causal laws involved. Physical processes can, it seems,
only be causes of further physical processes; the nature of the causal link
between the brain process and the sensation becomes wholly obscure.
As far as physics is concerned, one says that one state of affairs, A, is
the cause of a second state, B, if and only if, from a description of A
(initial conditions) plus a specification of relevant physical laws (physical
theory) one could in principle deduce a description of B. We have every
reason to believe that processes occurring in the optic nerve, for example,
frequently are a cause of visual sensations, in this sense of 'cause'. How-
ever the description of a visual sensation that one could perhaps in prin-
ciple derive from (a) a description of physical processes occurring in the
optic nerve, (b) specification of other relevant initial conditions, (c)
specification of relevant physical laws, would be a description of the
visual sensation as a physical process; one could not, even in principle,
derive a description of the visual sensation as a visual sensation from
a purely physical specification of initial conditions and relevant physical
laws. But this does not mean that there is some mysterious, additional
causal law linking brain process with visual sensation, because of course
the brain process is the visual sensation. In other words the occurrence of
sensations can, in principle, be explained causally, i.e. physically. The
fact that such an explanation invariably describes the sensation as a
physical process, and not as a sensation, does not mean that there is some
further conceptually puzzling causal link between physical process and
sensation. In fact in order to derive a description of the sensation as a
sensation from physical statements which describe relevant initial condi-
tions and physical laws, one only requires, in addition to these physical
statements, a statement of the empirical, non-physical fact that such and
such a physical process is such and such a sensation.
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